We study climate-related central bank communication using a novel dataset containing 35,487 speeches delivered by 131 central banks from 1986 to 2023. We employ natural language processing techniques to identify and trace the evolution of key climate-related narratives centred around (i) green finance, and (ii) climate-related financial risks. We find that central bank public communication strategies are primarily driven by underlying institutional factors, rather than exposure to climate-related risks. We then study the impact of climate-related communication on financial market dynamics through both a portfolio and a firm-level analysis. We find that equity returns of ‘green’ firms outperform those of ‘dirty’ firms when central banks engage more frequently and intensely with climate-related topics.

featured in Vox EU ; FT Alphaville ; The Conversation ; centralbanking.com ; AFSE Blog ; E-axes Digest ; Pugnalom 

We show how hawkish or dovish preferences shape how central bankers frame inflationary developments and prescribe policy solutions. Based on a quantitative and qualitative study of Eurozone central bank governors’ speeches from 2014 to 2023, we reveal patterns of selective engagement with economic data, strategic scepticism regarding theories and indicators, and weaponised uncertainty to support or cast doubt on monetary policy action. Crucially, these rhetorical strategies are leveraged conditionally on the inflation season, leading doves and hawks to act as migrating birds, embracing the other camp’s position when economic circumstances change. Casting further doubt upon the proclaimed science-based neutrality of central bankers, our study shows that central bank speeches should not be merely studied as reflections of policy learning or as instruments of reputation management, but also as rhetorical tools to achieve national policy preferences.

L’indépendance des banques centrales (ibc) repose sur des fondements théoriques dont on retrouve des traces dès les années 1920. Elle semble aujourd’hui avoir perdu en pertinence, l’idéal de neutralité qu’elle suppose étant remis en cause par la multiplication des interventions des banquiers centraux dans l’économie. Face aux conséquences distributives du central banking moderne sur les inégalités ou le changement climatique, l’ibc pourrait bien être entrée en crise.

In its 2021 strategy review, the European Central Bank's Governing Council unanimously decided to make climate change one of its priorities for the coming years. In this article, we try to understand how this change was achieved. To do so, we rely on mixed methods, studying ECB policies, speeches, exchanges with the European Parliament, and conducting semi-structured interviews. We present a detailed account of the rapid changes within the ECB regarding the climate challenge, and attempt to unpack its conditions of possibility. We show that climate integration results from the combination and hybridisation of internal dynamics and external pressures. On the one hand, the renewal of the Executive Board and modifications in organisational dynamics secured a growing coalition for a change. On the other, pressures from politicians, NGOs, academics and citizens pushed the institution to develop its expertise and provided willing insiders with further argumentative resources to push their green agenda. While these two intertwined dynamics have allowed ‘green doves’ to forge a consensus around the climate action plan, disagreements remain within the Governing Council on the scope and shape of future greening efforts.

received the 2022 EAEPE Herbert Simon award ; quoted in Le Monde

This article studies how institutional dynamics might affect and be affected by the implementation of climate-related financial policies. First, we propose a three-dimensional framework to distinguish: i) motives for policy implementation (prudential or promotional); ii) policy instruments (informational, incentive-based or quantity-based); and iii) implementing authorities (political or delegated). Second, we use this framework to show how sustainable financial interventions in certain jurisdictions - most notably, Europe - rely predominantly on informational policy instruments to achieve both promotional and prudential objectives. Policymakers in other jurisdictions - e.g. China - also employ incentive- or quantity-based instruments to achieve promotional objectives. Third, we identify two main institutional explanations for this European ‘promotional gap’: i) a reduced intervention of political authorities on the allocation of financial resources; and ii) a stronger independence of technical delegated authorities supervising financial dynamics. This governance configuration leads to an institutional deadlock in which only measures fitting with both political and delegated authorities' objectives can be implemented. Finally, we identify and discuss the possible institutional scenarios that could originate from the current setting, and stress the need for close cooperation between political and delegated authorities.

featured in SUERF Policy Note No. 205